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ABSTRACT 
The Standing Senate Committee on National Finance has recently recommended a 
major change in the way that the federal government provides support to the 
provinces for postsecondary education. It recommends that the cash transfers 
under EPF be eliminated and replaced with additional transfers of tax points to the 
provinces designed to provide the same amount of money. The Committee believes 
that the current arrangements do not influence the spending priorities of the 
provinces and such a change would not alter this fact. 
This paper argues that the Senate Report is based on an economic approach to 
grants that has been under serious question for 15 years. Both the traditional and 
the modern theory of grants are discussed. It is argued that there are reasons to 
believe that a change to the new arrangements would influence provincial 
spending priorities. Empirical estimates of the change show that provincial 
governments could be expected to decrease their support for postsecondary 
education by between $38 to $48 million per year over the next 5 years as a direct 
result of the proposed change in the way the transfers are made. 
RÉSUMÉ 
Le Comité sénatorial permanent des finances nationales a récemment recomman-
dé un important changement dans la façon dont le gouvernement fédéral offre son 
soutien aux provinces pour Tenseignement supérieur. Il recommande que l'on 
supprime les transferts de fonds effectués en vertu du financement des programmes 
établis (F.P.E.) et qu'on les remplace par l'octroi aux provinces de points 
d'impôts additionnels qui leur fourniraient le même montant d'argent. Le Comité 
estime que les dispositions actuelles n'ont pas d'effet sur le choix des dépenses 
ayant priorité pour les provinces, et que la modification proposée n'y changerait 
rien. 
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Dans cet article, on montre que le rapport du Sénat repose sur une approche 
économique qui, en ce qui concerne l'octroi des subventions, est sérieusement 
remise en question depuis quinze ans. On y discute à la fois de la théorie moderne 
et de la traditionnelle. On y soutient aussi qu'il existe des raisons de croire qu'un 
changement de dispositions aurait un effet sur le choix des dépenses auxquelles les 
provinces accordent la priorité. Des estimations empiriques montrent qu'on peut 
s'attendre à ce que les gouvernements provinciaux réduisent leur soutien à 
l'enseignement supérieur de 38 à 48 millions de dollars par année durant les cinq 
prochaines années, et ce, en conséquence directe du changement proposé pour le 
transfert des fonds. 
1.0 Introduction 
Financial transfers between the federal and the provincial governments have been 
described as the glue that holds the country together, and the transfers under the 
general rubric of Established Program Financing (EPF) are an important part of that 
glue. The EPF transfers are transfers from the federal government to the provincial 
governments which cover not only postsecondary education but health care and 
hospitalization as well. Cash transfers under this program in 1986-87 amount to 
$9,045 million, and if the value of the tax points transferred to the provinces are 
also included, the program cost rises to $16,729 million.1 Current projections are 
that the total value of these transfers, including both the cash and the value of the 
tax point transfers, will rise to $20,685 million by 1990-91. Such large transfers 
are likely to receive ongoing scrutiny, and indeed this is exactly what has 
happened. The program has been modified and revamped several times in the past 
15 years. There have been caps on the growth of transfers for higher education in 
1972, and again for higher education in the "6 & 5" program period in 1883-85. 
There was also a major change in 1977 which can be loosely interpreted to be a 
change from a system whereby the federal government cost-shared expenditures in 
these areas with the provinces to a system which gave unconditional grants to the 
provinces, a change that is widely predicted to have led the provinces to modify 
their spending priorities so that less is spent in these areas than would otherwise 
have been the case. 
The Established Program Financing (EPF) has been examined once again and 
the results of these deliberations are contained in a Senate Report entitled Federal 
Policy on Postsecondary Education released in March, 1987. The Senate Report 
has hit upon one of the central features of the program which has been discussed 
since the changes in 1977, namely the unconditional cash transfers and their 
relationship with the tax points which were transferred to the provinces at that 
time. Essentially, the Senate Report holds that there is no analytical distinction 
between the two ways of transferring money to the provinces since both increase 
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provincial revenues with no constraint on how the provinces choose to spend the 
money. The reasoning is clearly explained in the Report: 
Because the money is transferred without safeguards or conditions, it has 
simply increased provincial government revenues. This does not mean that 
postsecondary education in Canada has not benefitted from the transferred 
money; it means, however, that there is nothing to rccommcnd this way - the 
EPF way - of transferring the money. The only thing which the federal 
government has done through the transfer of the postsecondary portion of 
EPF is to contribute to the general revenues of the provincial governments. 
The same amount of money transferred to each province outside the EPF 
framework and devoid of conditions might have had the same results. (Senate 
Report, p. 101) 
In making the statement that there is an equivalence between the impact on 
spending of cash and tax-point transfers, the Senate Report voices the wisdom of 
the traditional economics approach to this issue.2 However, this view of cash 
transfers has been under serious question for 15 years precisely because it failed to 
explain adequately the empirical findings on how recipients of transfers actually 
behaved. Since the Senate Report uses this inadequate approach as the basis for 
recommending a major change in the way that the federal support for post-
secondary education is made available to the provincial governments, it seems 
that it is time for the challenge to the conventional wisdom to be made more widely 
available. The recommendation of the Senate Report that is relevant to this 
discussion is as follows: 
The Committee suggests that the solution is for the federal government to 
terminate the PSE (postsecondary education) portion of EPF (Established 
Program Financing) and transfer adequate financial resources to the provincial 
governments. This could be done by converting some or all of the money 
currently transferred in the form of cash payments into equalized tax points to 
be given to the provinces along with the personal and corporate tax points 
already transferred for health and education. (Senate Report, p. 102. Explana-
tion of acronyms added.) 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it will explain the reasoning on 
which the traditional approach to the equivalence of cash transfers and tax point 
transfers is based and the alternative approaches that are currently emerging. The 
predictions of the competing theories are different, and the appropriateness of the 
Senate recommendation is contingent upon which of the approaches is most 
relevant. However, this discussion might be just an interesting footnote to the 
Senate Report if the distinction made little difference to the funds that will be 
available for postsecondary education. Consequently, the paper also attempts to 
estimate the empirical magnitude of the change in funds available if the 
recommendation were to be implemented. It will be shown that the funding 
implications of the Senate Committee recommendation on this issue are 
potentially very serious for postsecondary education, a possibility not even 
considered in the Senate Report. 
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2.0 The Traditional Position 
The traditional theory of grants differentiates between grants which alter the price 
at the margin of decision for the service covered by the grant program, and grants 
which increase the resources available to be spent on this or other services but do 
not alter the price of the service at the margin of decision. There are variations on 
this theme for cases where there are other institutional restrictions such as a 
restriction that the spending on the relevant program cannot be less than the 
amount of the grant, but the basic theme differentiates between the effect which 
arises solely because of an effective increase in the resources available to the 
recipient unit (the income effect) and an effective change in the price of the service 
to the recipient (the substitution effect) even if there had been no improvement in 
the real resource availability to the recipient. 
This distinction is very important in understanding the predicted effect of 
changes in the EPF arrangements. Until 1972, federal assistance for post-
secondary education was structured so that the federal government paid 50 percent 
of the operating costs for postsecondary education.3 This effectively reduced the 
cost of spending in this area for the provinces to 50 cents on the dollar, and it is 
predicted that they would choose to spend more on this area than would have been 
the case if they were required to finance the full amount of any additional spending 
entirely from their own resources. As a result of the 1977 revision of the EPF 
arrangements, the provinces were able to receive the full amount of the federal 
grant regardless of what they did with spending on postsecondary education, so 
that additional spending on higher education effectively cost them $1 for each 
additional $1 that they chose to spend in this area. That was because there was no 
longer any influence on the federal transfers to a province as a result of a province 
changing its spending on postsecondary education. Since the cost to a province at 
the margin of decision had risen from 50 cents to $ 1 for each additional dollar that a 
province chose to spend, it is predicted that each affected province would choose 
to spend less than otherwise in this area. 
The actual situation was complicated by the fact that the federal government had 
imposed an effective ceiling on federal contributions to spending on post-
secondary education in 1972. At that time a ceiling was set so that the federal 
contribution did not rise by more than 15 percent per year in total for all provinces, 
a change that Wu (1986) has claimed increased the cost to the provinces at the 
margin of decision to near $1 by 1973 or 1974. This observation does not detract 
from the claim that the provinces would choose to spend less on postsecondary 
education than would have been the case under cost-sharing, but it does suggest 
that the provinces would have begun adjusting to the removal of cost-sharing in 
1973 or 1974 rather than 1977 as is commonly assumed.4 
However, the changes incorporated in the 1977 arrangements are the ones most 
relevant to the analysis leading to the recommendation of the Senate Report. At 
that time the federal government agreed to provide the money for postsecondary 
education to the provinces in the form of an unconditional transfer.5 This ensured 
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that the provinces were not obligated to match the federal contribution to 
postsecondary education and so could allocate their total provincial resources in 
line with provincial priorities rather than the federal priorities that are evidenced by 
the amount of the transfers. The federal position was that this program was now 
"established" so that the stimulus of cost-sharing was no longer necessary. A 
further feature of the arrangements enabled the federal government to limit the 
increase in the federal cash contribution to the increase in the real growth in the 
economy to which, among other things, federal tax revenues were linked. Once it 
was agreed that the federal transfers would be in the form of unconditional 
transfers to the provincial governments, the issue reduced to the way in which the 
unconditional transfers were to be made. 
The actual arrangements, with transitional arrangements for levelling up and 
levelling down are quite complicated, but the basic principle is clear. The money 
could be transferred in two ways. It could be transferred directly in the form of 
cash. It could also be transferred in the form of tax points. The transfer of tax points 
involved the federal government in computing how much its own tax rates on 
personal and corporate income could be reduced in order to reduce federal tax 
revenues by the agreed upon amount. Provinces could then raise their own tax rates 
by an amount that would recover the same agreed amount of tax revenue.6 
Provincial taxpayers would then pay the same amount of tax but they would pay 
less to the federal government and more to their respective provincial govern-
ments. The 1977 arrangements dictate that the transfers are to be made to the 
provinces half in the form of unconditional cash transfers and half in the form of a 
transfer of tax points. It is this division between cash and tax points that is at the 
heart of the discussion in the Senate Report on this issue. 
The traditional theory claims that an unconditional transfer will have the same 
effect regardless of whether it is made in the form of tax points or cash, provided 
the amount of money transferred is the same in both cases. This is because there is 
no change in the effective price of provincial spending in this area at the crucial 
margin of decision under either choice as compared to a situation where there was 
no program transfer at all. That is, in both cases the provinces would pay $1 from 
their own resources for each additional $1 that they chose to spend on 
postsecondary education and with the same amount of money involved in the 
transfer the provinces would make the same decisions on spending in this area 
(Bradford and Oates, 1971). 
In the circumstance, it might seem irrelevant in what form the transfer took 
place, and, to the extent that the same amount of money is involved, the traditional 
approach claims that it is irrelevant. However, the tax points were not entirely 
equalized so that in practice the tax points will generate more revenue for the 
provinces which have the richest tax bases than for provinces with poor tax bases. 
The Canadian solution is a compromise, and in this case it amounted to providing 
half cash and half tax points while guaranteeing that no province would receive 
less than it would have received if the transfer had all been in the form of cash. 
Eventually, the tax bases for all of the provinces are expected to grow enough that 
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the tax revenue from the new provincial tax points will be as great as the provincial 
governments would have received from additional cash transfers. However, 
because of an unexpectedly sluggish growth in government revenues in the 5 years 
following this arrangement, the 1982 arrangements were modified to ensure the 
provinces receive as much as they would have received under a cash transfer, but 
the complicated nature of the institutional arrangements can mask their analytical 
simplicity. The EPF transfers for postsecondary education became unconditional 
transfers with the federal government making no unique attempt to ensure that the 
provinces matched their spending in this area. In practice there were some federal 
grumblings when it began to emerge that the provinces may have acted upon their 
incentive to reduce their support for postsecondary education below what would 
have occurred if the transfers had not been unconditional, but the provincial 
response was entirely consistent with the analytical principle embodied in the 
arrangements and should not have been a surprise to any of the parties. 
A pattern that emerges is that the federal government has been reducing its 
stimulus to provincial support for postsecondary education since 1972. The 
Senate Report is consistent with this pattern. It notes that the effect of both the tax 
point and the cash transfers is to increase provincial revenues with no restriction on 
how those revenues are used. A movement toward abolishing the cash transfers in 
favour of additional tax point transfers can then be seen not as a device to save the 
federal government money, but as a way of eliminating the federal government 
presence from an area where the Senate committee thinks there is no clearly 
defined rationale for the federal government to be involved in the first place. As the 
Report states: 
In the Committee's view EPF is a program which never was intended to have a 
direct impact on the postsecondary education system in Canada. The same 
amount of money transferred to each province outside the EPF framework and 
unrelated to any program could have had exactly the same influence on 
postsecondary education as the money now transferred under EPF. (Senate 
Report, p. 95) 
The matter of whether the federal government should be involved in the general 
support of the postsecondary education system is interesting in its own right, but 
the focus of this paper is to dispute the claim that the elimination of the cash 
transfers in favour of additional transfers of tax points will not influence provincial 
behavior. 
3.0 A Critique of the Traditional Approach 
The traditional theory of grants outlined above is a positive theory in that it is 
designed to give predictions about what will happen to the level of spending on 
higher education in response to changes in the level of grants. There is nothing 
implicit in this theory that requires this to be the "correct" level of spending, in any 
normative sense, and in this respect the modern theory of grants is no different than 
the traditional approach. However, in the context of the debate over how to finance 
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higher education, the positive perspective is an important perspective to maintain. 
The problem here is to be able to predict what the effect on spending for higher 
education will be if the grant arrangements are changed, an important piece of 
information without which informed choices are difficult to make. 
The modern theory of grants differs from the traditional theory in that it suggests 
that the movement from cash transfers to transfers of additional tax points would 
influence provincial spending in the area of higher education, even if there was no 
change in the net revenue received by the provinces and even if the cash transfer 
had been unconditional in the first place. The modern theory has been developed in 
response to the recognition that the traditional theory does not adequately explain 
the empirical results from studies of grants. Although the traditional theory 
predicts that the effect on spending would be the same if the recipient jurisdiction 
received an increase in its own income or received an unconditional grant of the 
same amount7, the empirical literature suggests that spending is significantly 
higher when the resource increase is in the form of an unconditional transfer. 
Mieszkowski and Oakland (1979) note that the literature suggests that "a dollar of 
unmatched aid results in a 45 cent increase in public spending, while the marginal 
propensity to spend on local public goods out of income is estimated to be about 
.10" (Mieszkowski and Oakland, 1979: 1). The Canadian evidence is sparce but 
supportive. Hardy (1976) explicitly tested both unconditional transfers and 
provincial income as explanatory variables for spending on postsecondary 
education in Ontario. He notes: "When, however, Y [per capita net provincial 
product] and G [per capita Federal unconditional grants] were entered as separate 
independent variables, the estimated coefficient attached to the unconditional 
grant variable in the Ontario estimate was both positive and significant. This 
would appear to indicate that federal grants for postsecondary education were 
significantly influencing Ontario's educational expenditure decisions" (Hardy, 
1976:184). 
The modern approach to the theory of grants assumes that individuals, usually in 
their role as voters and taxpayers, attempt to maximize their own welfare subject to 
the constraints they face. The modern theory links voter preferences with the 
economic outcomes through a political model and so can be viewed as a model of 
demand for higher education. This approach is individualistic and differs from the 
approach often found in the traditional literature where the provincial government 
is viewed as if it was an individual decision unit (Hardy, 1976; Auld, 1976). The 
difference is significant, since it raises issues that relate to how the decisive voters 
determine how much spending they desire. There is not one quantity which would 
be desired by a specific province, but a variety of possible outcomes with the actual 
outcome dependent on the preferences of the decisive voter. The approach in the 
public choice literature is to incorporate a median voter model where the decisive 
voter is assumed to be the voter with the median level of income (Inman, 1978). 
The relevant preferences are the preferences of the median voter so that changes in 
the income or price to the median voter lead to a prediction that the desired level of 
spending will change.8 
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There are a variety of possible ways in which the constraints faced by the median 
voter could change and it is useful to consider each one. Different writers have 
concentrated on different factors so that it appears that there are several 
explanations of why the median voter would prefer a change in the level of 
spending. However, all of the contributions propose to improve on the traditional 
model by offering a better explanation of what actually happens. One survey of 
these theories is to be found in Fisher (1982). The alternative approach has been 
dubbed a "flypaper" theory of grants since it purports to address why it is that 
money sticks where it is thrown (Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld, 1979: 6). 
The first possibility is that the model needs to be refined to more accurately 
represent the situation for the median (decisive) voter. It may be that the resources 
available to the median voter are different if there is a cash transfer from the federal 
government as opposed to a substitution of provincial for federal taxes when a tax 
point transfer is made. This is because the increase in the median voter's tax 
payments to the province need not equal its share of the cost of the cash transfer. 
For example, some jurisdictions have the ability to export some of their tax burden 
onto non-residents, and so the tax increase on the residents to raise the revenue to 
replace the cash transfers is accordingly lower. Also, the type of tax structures, 
both in terms of bases and progressivity, are different for the federal and provincial 
governments. This means that the relative position of the median voter is likely to 
be different and so the relative cost of financing transfers for postsecondary 
education will be different also. These arguments suggest that the taxes of the 
median voter may well change even if the overall resources available to the 
province are unaffected. The "flypaper" theories would then predict that the 
median voter would desire a different level of spending whereas the traditional 
theories would predict that the desired level of spending would be unaffected. 
The second possibility is that there is some misperception by provincial 
taxpayers about the true cost of postsecondary education when the federal 
government transfers cash to the provinces. This amounts to there being some 
fiscal illusion for taxpayers, a possibility that is ignored in the traditional theory. 
Both Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979) and Oates (1979) suggest that the 
decisive provincial taxpayer acts as if the total cost of higher education is really 
lower by the amount of the grant so that the price per unit is lower for the quantity 
received. This amounts to the taxpayer reacting to what is perceived to be the 
average price of postsecondary education rather than the real marginal price that 
traditional economic models concentrate upon. Under this scenario the decisive 
taxpayer wants more of what is perceived to be a cheaper service than would have 
been desired if the provinces had not received the cash transfer. If the cash transfer 
was eliminated in favour of the transfer of tax points to the provinces, the decisive 
provincial taxpayer would recognize that their own provincial taxes were rising in 
order to finance increased spending on postsecondary education. There would be 
a more direct link between the provincial taxes and provincial spending. In this 
case the decisive voter would desire less spending on postsecondary education 
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precisely because the true resource cost of such services was more clearly 
recognized. A very simple version of such a model is developed by Oates (1979). 
In the context of the Senate Report, the fiscal illusion argument suggests that 
there is likely to be a significant negative impact from the elimination of the cash 
grants even if the provinces raise the same additional resources from their own 
taxpayers with no net increase in the total cost to provincial taxpayers. Of course, 
improving the information on which voters decide should also improve the 
decisions that taxpayers make, although the presence of other constraints makes it 
impossible to tell if the movement is in the direction that the taxpayer would desire 
if all other costs and benefits were accurately included. The important point to 
emphasize is that the fiscal illusion argument predicts that the Senate Committee 
recommendation would result in less provincial government support for higher 
education. 
A third possibility is developed by Hamilton (1983). This argument suggests 
that taxpayers are able to receive the education services that they desire partly from 
the public sector and partly from the private sector. Furthermore, as their income 
rises they are able to use the services provided by the public sector more efficiently 
because they are able to afford more of the complementary services available in the 
private sector. For example in postsecondary education, students are required to 
purchase some books and materials, and these materials are complementary to the 
course instruction provided. Indeed they are substitutes for the provision of such 
materials in such places as university libraries and entail much lower transaction 
costs to read and reference. The higher the student income the more such 
complementary materials they are likely to have. Consequently, an increase in 
income has the effect of enabling the student to use the system more efficiently and 
so, other things being equal, less public spending on postsecondary education is 
required. Second, there is an additional effect since the public sector price for a 
unit of education services drops as students supply more of the inputs and this will 
tend to encourage more spending in this area. Essentially students are paying a 
greater part of the cost of their education. The relative strength of these two effects, 
induced by a change in income but not by a change in unconditional grants, will 
determine what happens to the desired level of spending on postsecondary 
education. In Hamilton's model (1983) it implies that there will be less spending 
induced by an increase in income than there is for an increase in unconditional 
grants. In the case of the Senate Committee proposal, the increase in income for 
provincial taxpayers is induced by the effective decline in federal taxes used to 
finance the grants. Taxpayers may then decide to restore some of the funding from 
increases in provincial taxes but they might then also attempt to keep a portion of 
the tax change in the form of lower provincial taxes or decide to increase spending 
in other areas. The essential point is to recognize that there is no reason to assume 
the effect will be neutral. 
Another of the "flypaper" theories also focusses on the supply side of the 
provision of public services rather than restricting the analysis to changes in the 
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constraints of the median voter on the demand side. One such model is developed 
by Romer and Rosenthal (1980). The basic argument here is that government 
officials attempt to keep resources in the public sector because it is in their best 
interest to do so. This approach is in the tradition of the theories of bureaucracy that 
focus on the self-interested behaviour of public employees. Government officials 
have an incentive to maintain public spending higher than the median voter 
desires, and to the extent that they are successful, spending becomes less 
responsive to changes in the income level of the median voter. A change in the 
income of the median voter does not change the current level of spending, just the 
unobserved level desired by the median voter. However, a change in the resources 
available to the government officials does change the level of spending. In Romer 
and Rosenthal (1980) an increase in an unconditional grant does not change the 
unobserved level desired by the median voter, but does increase the resources that 
the public sector could appropriate without making the median voter any worse off 
and so results in greater public spending than would an equivalent change in 
income alone. In the case of the Senate Report, there is a reduction rather than an 
increase in the cash grant component, so the effect would be in reverse. The 
provincial government would lose access to a large unconditional grant and would 
be unable to maintain spending without increasing provincial taxes. This increases 
the provincial taxpayers' resistance to the relatively high level of spending 
previously in effect and so is predicted to result in less spending on postsecondary 
education. 
This section is meant to show that, contrary to the prediction of the traditional 
theory of grants, there is reason to think that the substitution of tax points for cash 
transfers will not have a neutral effect on provincial spending on postsecondary 
education. The modern theory of grants links the decision on spending, through 
the political process, to the preferences of the median (decisive) voter and the 
constraints that apply to the median voter. There are several reasons to think that 
the change will not be neutral from the perspective of the decisive voter even if the 
overall resource change to any provincial government could be neutral. More 
caution is appropriate than is observable in the Senate Report. 
4.0 Is The Impact Significant? 
Some estimate of the likely impact of a change in the federal financing of higher 
education is appropriate. This is difficult for Canada because of the paucity of 
empirical work that can be directly used to address the problem. There are a 
number of studies exploring the impact of grants on spending, but only one which 
provides consistent and unconstrained estimates of the impact on spending for 
higher education of both increases in own provincial revenues and unconditional 
grants. This is a study by Wu (1986).9 Using the pooled estimates for all provinces 
for a 15 year period (1967-1982) the empirical evidence in Wu (1986) suggests that 
there is a substantially different effect when a province receives an unconditional 
cash grant than is the case when the province raises revenue from its own tax 
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sources. Wu estimates that a $1 increase in own provincial revenues is associated 
with an increase in spending on postsecondary education of 2.8 cents. The corre-
sponding increase is 70.6 cents for each $1 in income received in the form of an 
unconditional grant from the federal government. The results suggest that 
substituting more tax room for less cash subsidies would result in a net decrease in 
spending on higher education of 67.8 cents per dollar of transfer involved.10 
There are $2.9 billion of cash transfers designated nominally for postsecondary 
education in 1987-88. These estimates might be used to suggest that provincial 
spending on higher education could fall by $2.0 billion, an extreme result that does 
not recognize the tendency for governments to not actually reduce the nominal 
level of support to postsecondary education.1 ' The provinces will likely desire to 
spend less but the provinces are more likely to reduce support for postsecondary 
education by reducing the rate of increase in their support over time. Even with low 
rates of inflation such a policy can reduce the real level of support substantially. 
Using this more conservative interpretation of the political economy of grants 
implies the increase in spending on postsecondary education will fall as provincial 
revenues increase more from own tax sources and less from unconditional 
transfers.12 
Using the estimates of Wu (1986) the impact of these changes on spending on 
postsecondary education is estimated and the results are shown in Table 1. The 
stimulus to provincial support of postsecondary education, both from the 
unconditional cash transfers and the tax points, are estimated at between $44 and 
$57 million a year over the next 5 years under the current arrangements. If the 
Senate Committee proposal were implemented, and the existing unconditional 
cash transfers were replaced with additional transfers of tax points, the stimulus to 
provincial support for postsecondary education is estimated at between $8 and $9 
million per year over the same period. This would amount to a reduction of 
between $38 and $48 million per year of provincial support for postsecondary 
education. The shift from using a combination of unconditional cash transfers and 
tax point transfers to a system based on using only tax point transfers is estimated 
to have a significant impact on spending on higher education. The reason is that an 
increase in own revenues stimulates a much smaller increase in spending on 
postsecondary education than does an unconditional transfer generating the same 
amount of revenue for the provincial government. 
Of course, the federal government has not been a passive provider of 
unconditional transfers to the provincial governments. The federal government 
has been vocal in its concern over the changed spending priorities of the provincial 
governments. Indeed, it has consistently pointed out the size of the transfers 
involved in the tax point transfer of 1977 whereas the provinces might reasonably 
begin to think that these are their own revenues, raised by provincial taxes and for 
which they are responsible to provincial voters. In fact, the public pressure by the 
federal government may have encouraged the provinces to spend more of the 
revenues from the tax-point transfers on EPF programs than they would have 
chosen to spend if the taxes were raised from new tax initiatives of their own 
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Table 1 
Estimate of Impact of 
Chang«a in the 
Post-Secondary Education Portion 
of Established Program Financing 
Year 
Value of Increase In Increase in Spending 









Î $ $ $ $ $ 
1986-87 2 903 2, 467 
1987-88 2 959 2,722 56 255 46.7 8.7 
1988-89 3 Oil 2,985 52 263 44.1 8.8 
1989-90 3 060 3,256 49 271 42 .2 9.0 
1990-91 3 132 3,508 72 252 57.9 9.1 
Source: Calculated from Federal Policy on Post-Secondary Education: Report 
of the Standing Senate Coxnnittee on National Finances, Table 2.8, p.26. 
Notes: 1. The value of the cash transfers and tax-points for post-secondary 
education is found by assuming that 32.1 percent of the total EPF transfers 
are allocated to this spending area. This division is essentially arbitrary 
as recognized by the Senate Report. 
2. Cash transfers are assumed to induce 70.6 cents of additional 
spending on post-secondary education for each $1 of additional transfer 
from the federal government. See Wu (1986). 
3. Tax-points transfers axe assumed to induce 2.8 cents of 
additional spending .on post-secondary education for each $1 of tax revenue 
involved in the transfer of tax room from the federal government. See Wu 
(1986). 
choice. If this is the case then the Wu (1986) estimates for spending on 
postsecondary education out of own revenues are too low for the tax-point 
transfers, and the impact of the move away from cash transfers would be smaller 
than is implied in Table 1. 
5.0 Summary and Conclusions 
The Senate Report has recommended that the federal government eliminate cash 
transfers under EPF in favour of additional tax-point transfers from the federal 
government to the provincial governments. This effectively reduces the amount of 
taxes that people pay to the federal government and increases their tax obligations 
to the provincial governments by the same amount. It is important to emphasize 
that the total tax liability to both levels of government does not change, only the 
distribution of the tax liability between the federal and the provincial governments. 
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The position of the Senate Report is that the federal government never intended to 
have a direct impact on higher education through the EPF arrangements and even if 
it did, unconditional cash transfers are an ineffective way of influencing the 
spending priorities of the provinces. Consequently, eliminating the cash transfers 
from the federal government and having the provinces increase their own tax 
revenues by the same amount, leaves the provinces with the same amount of 
money and less federal government presence in an area where the federal 
government has both no articulated federal objective and no influence on 
provincial decisions. 
This paper addresses one of these issues, the claim that the federal government 
does not influence the spending priorities of the provincial governments when it 
makes unconditional cash transfers under EPF. The argument advanced in this 
paper is that unconditional transfers do influence the spending priorities of the 
provincial governments and that the modern literature on grants has developed a 
variety of models to explain the consistent empirical findings that this is the case. 
There is reason to believe that the position advanced by the Committee is too 
simplistic in that it does not capture either the complicated nature of the decisions 
that taxpayers are required to make or the complicated institutional arrangements 
that might prevent such a neutral effect from occurring. 
This is not a disagreement over how to best formulate a theory of grants. At a 
time when postsecondary education is facing some serious decisions, some of 
which result from years of provincial financial restraint on the institutions of 
higher learning, a major change in the EPF arrangements in the way envisaged by 
the Senate Report could result in an even greater restraint by the provinces than 
would otherwise have been the case. The Senate Committee might have adopted a 
position that spending in the area of postsecondary education needs to be reduced, 
and if that had been the case then the debate would be over the normatively 
appropriate level of support. However, the arguments developed here are very 
relevant to the policy debate over the actual recommendations of the Senate 
Report. The Senate Report is arguing that its proposal would not change the 
stimulus that the existing grants provide to the provinces with regard to spending in 
this area. Surely it is folly to procede without being aware of the unintended impact 
that such a change could be expected to have. Maybe the Senate Committee will 
have no significant impact on federal government policy, but it would also be folly 
to assume that this is so and fail to point out the implications of the proposal .This is 
the kind of proposal that might be particularly attractive to a federal government 
committed to greater provincial automomy. It deserves to be subjected to careful 
scrutiny. 
N O T E S 
1. Federal Policy on Postsecondary Education, p .26 
2. The assumption is so deeply ingrained in the economics literature that it is rarely recognized 
explicitly, but it is embodied in the discussion. See. for example . Courchene (1979) or Boadway 
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(1980). Kapsalis (1982) expresses disagreement with the assumption that the 1977 arrangements 
were a shift f rom cost-sharing to block funding for health care and hospitalization, but does not 
question the equivalence of the cash and tax point transfers in his analysis. However , Kapsalis 
(1982) explicitly references the literature which chal lenges the traditional view that block funding 
is neutral. 
3 The 50 percent cost sharing applied to seven of the provinces. Three provinces, Newfound land , 
Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick received per capita grants and so were effect ively block 
funded already. 
4. Kapsalis (1982) notes that the changes introduced in 1972 probably had the effect of moving the 
system toward block funding before 1977. but then explicitly uses the 50 percent cost-sharing 
formula for the pre-1977 period in Table 3, p. 225. 
5. The E P F arrangements also covered health care and hospitalization, but the shift to block funding 
is more quest ionable for these programs because of the complicated manner in which the 
cost-sharing was structured prior to 1977. See Kapsalis (1982). 
6. A tax point amounted to 1 percent of the Basic Federal Tax attributable to each province .The tax 
point transfer was subject to equalizat ion so that the yield to each province was brought up to the 
level of the national average yield. This ensured that poor provinces did not lose as a result of 
having tax bases poorer than the national average. 
7. Slack (1980) is an excellent example of this approach. In this study, the empirical results are 
restricted to give the same result regardless of the source of the increase in resources. No 
inconsistency in the theory is noted because none is permitted to exist. 
8. If the demand for the public service is single peaked , then voters with less income will demand less 
of the service and voters with more income will demand more. In practice, there are significant 
factors other than income to consider and these are included in a median voter model . Inman 
(1978) has a test of whether the median voter is actually decisive, and f inds strong support for the 
proposition that it is. For a critical examinat ion of the median voter model , f rom a theoretical 
perspective, see Romer and Rosenthal (1979) . 
9. Wu (1986) develops a model of the reduced form: 
E = (R, G, m, N) 
where E = per capita gross provincial expendi ture on postsecondary educat ion by province in 
constant 1971-72 dollars. 
R = per capita provincial government revenue by province in constant 1 9 7 1 - 7 2 dollars. 
G = conditional or uncondit ional federal grant per capita by province in constant 1 9 7 1 - 7 2 
dollars. 
m = net marginal price of higher educat ion, by province 
N = full-t ime equivalent postsecondary educat ion participation rate, by province (in percent) 
The study covers the period 1 9 6 7 - 1 9 8 2 . The pooled time series and cross section result f rom a 
two-stage least-squares analysis is: 
E = b0 + b ,R + b , G + b 3 m + b 4 N 
16.764 + .0286 + .7061 - .1023 - 5 .3261 Adj . R 2 = .63 
(2.84) (6.36) (4 .18) ( - 2 . 2 7 ) (2 .05) 
NOTE: the figures in parentheses are t-ratios. 
10. These results are more divergent than the U. S. evidence on the same issue. Caution is appropriate 
when interpreting the precise coeff ic ients in the model . 
11. For example , recall the diff icult ies when the Province of British Columbia reduced university 
budgets in nominal terms. 
12. Note that Wu uses own provincial income to the provincial government rather than a measure of 
the income available in the province. This permits a test of the respective strengths of own revenue 
and unconditional grants that is not possible if net provincial product (Hardy, 1976) or a similar 
aggregate income variable is used. 
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